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By <u>W.F.</u> NARA Date <u>7/12/97</u>

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Our Future Relationship with the People's Republic
of China

The basic principles of the new Sino-American relationship, for the present and future, are spelled out in the Joint Communiqué issued at Shanghai on February 28, 1972, at the conclusion of President Nixon's visit. This is attached at Tab A.

The Shanghai Communiqué spelled out the positions of the two sides on the full range of issues, bilateral and multilateral: Taiwan, Asia generally, Indochina, Japan, India-Pakistan, Korea, and US-PRC trade, cultural and other bilateral exchanges. In addition, in private conversations beginning with President Nixon's visit, the two sides have exchanged mutual assurances on these and other major subjects, such as the Soviet threat, Western Europe and the Middle East.

This memorandum summarizes the significant assurances that the United States has given to the People's Republic of China as part of this exchange.

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Taiwan

In the Shanghai Communiqué at Tab A, the United States declared the following:

"The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U. S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes."

In the Communiqué on my subsequent visit to China in November 1973 [Tab B], this prospect was broadened as followed:

"The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China; the

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United States Government does not challenge that position. The Chinese side reiterated that the normalization of relations between China and the United States can be realized only on the basis of confirming the principle of one China."

On the basis of these public and other private statements, the United States committed itself to achieve the full normalization of relations with the PRC in the term of this Administration, that is, by 1976. We agreed to continue with further steps "confirming the principle of one China."

- We have stated that we oppose any two-China policy; that we will oppose any move toward Taiwanese independence; and that we will oppose any third-country interference or attempt to move into Taiwan (e.g., Japan or the USSR).
- The United States will support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. We would oppose any military move from Taiwan against the mainland.
- In 1974, we are in the process of substantially reducing U. S. military forces on Taiwan. We have stated to the PRC that

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that we intend to disengage from our military presence and our military supply relationship by the end of this Administration.

-- In 1974 we will remove the two squadrons of F-4 Phantoms that are now on Taiwan, one squadron in the first six months and the second squadron in the second half of the year. We will remove the U-2 planes from Taiwan this year, and we shall remove all nuclear weapons which are in Taiwan this year. This will reduce our military presence to communications and logistics.

-- We terminated our grant military assistance program of material aid to Taiwan in June 1973. We will continue a small program of military sales for a few more years but this relates only to equipment that is clearly defensive in character (F-5 parts, coastal patrol craft, air defense equipment) or engineering equipment (trucks, road building machinery).

-- We have told the PRC that we intend to move toward full diplomatic relations before mid-1976. We would like to

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work out with the PRC a formula that permits some form of continued U.S. representation on Taiwan and some understanding that commits the PRC to a peaceful resolution of the question of reunification; the Chinese are resistant to these reservations, but we intend to negotiate with them further.

-- I have been planning another trip to Peking some time this fall, for the specific purpose of working out with the Chinese a more explicit timetable of next steps toward full normalization.

Soviet Union

Next to the issue of Taiwan, which is to them a question of national destiny, the greatest preoccupation of the Peking leaders is the Soviet threat, which is their overwhelming national security problem. In this regard, we have stated to them the following:

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- The United States will keep the Chinese leaders meticulously informed of all significant U. S. negotiations and agreements with the Soviet Union. We will make no secret agreements with the Soviet Union. We will inform the PRC well in advance on significant negotiations, and if the PRC wishes to comment, the U. S. will always be prepared to hear its views and take them most seriously.
- The U. S. will keep the PRC informed particularly on developments in SALT and in the strategic balance.
- The U. S. is willing to make any agreement with the PRC (arms control, trade, etc.) that we make with the Soviet Union.
- The U. S. will never make any agreement with the Soviet Union that is directed against China or Chinese interests or is designed to isolate China. We will not collude with Moscow against Peking in any form. The U. S. will not join in agreements that the USSR can use as propaganda against China (such as a universal test ban).
- In U. S. -Soviet meetings, under no circumstances will the U. S. negotiate about or discuss its relations with the PRC

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without the PRC's knowledge and approval. If the Soviets raise the question of China, the U. S. is willing to relay Premier Chou's position that the PRC seeks improved relations with the USSR, opposes hegemony, and does not seek collusion against anyone.

-- The U. S. wants good relations with both the PRC and the USSR and welcomes better relations between them, in the interest of world peace. We would not welcome a Sino-Soviet war.

-- The U. S. is prepared to make every effort, as in the India-Pakistan crisis of 1971, to neutralize Soviet threats and deter Soviet threats against the PRC.

-- The U. S. regards the Soviet Union as our principal national security problem, and our firm policy is to work everywhere and in every way to counter Soviet expansionism and moderate Soviet behavior. Our public policy of detente is to reassure our people; the reality of our policy is to maintain our vigilance and our defenses and to react strongly against irresponsible

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Soviet conduct. We will not permit the Soviet Union to use the relaxation of tensions as a means to weaken our alliances or our defenses.

-- If the Soviet Union attacks China, the United States would regard this as a threat to international stability and American security.


-- I will be glad to discuss with you privately other details of U.S. -Chinese relations in this regard.

-- Should the Soviet Union attack China, we are determined to oppose it, by our own decision and without any arrangement with China.

South Asia

The Chinese see the "southern rim" of Asia -- the area stretching from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan to India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh to Southeast Asia -- as the integrated whole. They see the Soviet Union seeking to penetrate this area in an effort to encircle China. The Chinese leaders have asked us to pay attention to this area, to support our friends there, and to help block Soviet penetration. We have stated that we agree with this analysis:

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- The U. S. is committed to the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan. We will support Pakistan with economic and military assistance to the extent permitted by Congress. We will work with our friend the Shah of Iran to resist Soviet encroachments and to provide assistance to Pakistan against Indian or Soviet pressure.
- We will assist Bangladesh so as not to leave the field free to Moscow and New Delhi.
- We will move gradually to improve our relations with India, always with the objective of weaning it away from Soviet influence and in the direction of a moderate policy toward Pakistan and China.
- We will give material support to the Kurds in their resistance to Soviet-supported Iraq, both through the Shah and directly.
- We will pay close attention to the behavior of the new Soviet-supported regime in Afghanistan and will support its neighbors against any encroachments.

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-- We will be more active in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.

Korea

The Chinese are fearful of seeing Japanese influence extend to Korea. They also desire the liquidation of the vestiges of the UN military presence in Korea which of course was their adversary in the Korean War. We have sought to work out a compromise formula with the PRC and our ally the Republic of Korea for the gradual removal of the U.S. military presence and for a UN decision to phase out the UN Command.

-- The U.S. will use its influence to discourage Japanese interference in Korea and will oppose any Japanese military role in Korea.

-- We are prepared to negotiate a gradual timetable for liquidation of the UN Command and gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops, with the consent of our South Korean ally.

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-- The U.S. will support North-South reconciliation in Korea.

Europe

The Chinese regard a strong Western Europe as a bulwark against Soviet expansion and as an indirect contributor to China's security. We have assured the Chinese that we share their appreciation of the importance of Western Europe's security:

- The U.S. will not withdraw any substantial forces from Europe in the lifetime of this Administration. Even in an MBFR agreement, we would not expect to withdraw more than 10 - 15%.
- We will keep the PRC informed of prospects and developments in MBFR and CSCE.
- The U.S. will support Britain and France in the nuclear field so that Western Europe continues to have independent weight against the Soviet Union.
- Our policy in MBFR will be to educate our allies in the strategic realities, to resist Soviet attempts to weaken alliance

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cohesion or alliance defenses, and to enable us to resist
unilateral cuts in the Congress.

Trade and Other Bilateral Relations

Our firm policy is to expand the full range of our bilateral exchanges with the PRC as rapidly as is convenient to them. We, like they, see economic and other relations as following and symbolizing the fundamental political relationship. We, like they, do not see trade as an end in itself.

-- With respect to trade, the United States will place the PRC on the same legal status as the USSR. We will seek MFN for the PRC in the same legislation as MFN for the USSR.

-- The U.S. is prepared to settle the dispute over blocked assets and private claims comprehensively, not for commercial reasons but as a spur to progress in overall economic and political relations.

-- The U.S. will not give legal support to any claims connected with bonds issued by predecessor governments.

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- On the American side, we will seek to expand opportunities for American legislators (such as your trip with Congressman Boggs in June 1972) and private groups in many fields to have contacts with the PRC, in order to deepen the support of the American people for our new relationship with China over the long-term.
- We will be prepared to establish exchange programs whereby China can send students to America.
- The U. S. is prepared to cooperate on such matters as cancer research and will make available all the resources of NIH to other countries.
- Before the establishment of diplomatic relations, we are prepared to expand the status of the Liaison Offices so that they become more and more similar to full diplomatic recognition.
- We will not discuss MFN for the PRC with the Congress until the PRC tells us it wants us to do it.
- President Nixon had accepted the Chinese invitation to visit the PRC "at an appropriate time."

Southeast Asia

The Paris Agreement on Viet-Nam of January 1973 removed a major irritant in US-PRC relations. The U. S. has continued to assure the PRC that, while we will live up to our obligations to our allies,

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
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our military presence in Asia is not directed against the PRC or against Chinese interests.

- The U. S. will live up to the Vietnam agreement and will use its influence with the GVN to do so.
- We are prepared to normalize our relations with the DRV. We have an interest in Hanoi's independence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
- We will exercise and promote restraint by all parties in Indochina provided that Hanoi does not topple the Agreement.
- We are prepared to contribute to a negotiated solution in Cambodia. If there is a ceasefire and NVA withdrawal, we would encourage a political solution in which Sihanouk could play a major role. We are willing to discuss with China who might be acceptable negotiators in Cambodia and acceptable principals in an interim government.
- We will encourage our friends in Southeast Asia, such as Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia, to improve their relations with the PRC.

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- We will oppose the Soviet proposal of an Asian Collective Security Sphere.
- We will oppose any Soviet attempt to obtain naval facilities at Singapore.
- We will gradually withdraw U. S. forces from Thailand, but we believe that a sudden withdrawal would undermine stability in the area and tempt outside countries to interfere.

Japan

The Chinese continue to fear that Japanese economic power will inevitably translate itself into military power and into a policy of expansionism. The U. S. has sought to assure the PRC that we see our alliance with Japan as a moderating factor on Japan, and that we encouraged a PRC-Japanese rapprochement.

- President Nixon stated that the U. S. will use its influence in Asia to discourage Japanese intervention or expansion.

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
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- The U. S. will continue to use its influence to moderate Japanese policy and encourage reconciliation with the PRC.
- The U. S. will continue to make clear to Japan that we oppose Japanese nuclear armament or an overseas role for Japanese military forces.
- The U. S. is prepared to keep the PRC informed of developments in our relations with Japan, and is prepared to exchange information on possible Soviet-Japanese ties.
- The U. S. will seek to preserve its alliance and cooperation with Japan in order to anchor Japan in constructive relations with peaceful countries.

Arms Control

The Chinese do not wish to be pressed into international arms control negotiations because they see this as a Soviet device to weaken them or isolate them. The United States has scrupulously avoided doing anything that could be construed as pressure on China



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in this regard, such as to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to refrain from nuclear testing. At the Moscow summit in 1974, the Soviet Union sought to negotiate a complete test ban with us which would have included an appeal to all other countries to join it or an escape clause to permit the USSR to resume testing if any third country did. We rejected these as anti-Chinese maneuvers.

-- There will be no U. S. pressure for the U. S. to join the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

-- We are prepared to conclude with the PRC any kind of agreement that we have concluded with the USSR, such as the agreements on measures to prevent accidental war or the agreement on prevention of nuclear war.

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